It just occurred to me to check something.
There's 13 changes made from M16A1 to M16A2 (according to The Black Rifle 2). None of them are aimed at a reduction in mean rounds between failures. Most are aimed at making the gun more durable to the rigors of being handled by the infantry.
1. New flash-hider.
2. Beefed up barrel from the flash-hider to the muzzle.
3. Square front sight post.
4. Round handguards.
5. Delta ring.
6. Case deflector.
7. Range adjustable rear sight.
8. Round forward assist.
9. Beefed up lower.
10. New pistol grip.
11. 3-round burst.
12. Longer stock made from tougher materials.
13. New buttplate.
That's not a list made by a customer who likes the gun except the reliability.
Not mentioned in this list is the changes to accommodate the NATO standard M855 ball (which was simply a change in rifling twist) and the ejection port door (which was another soldier-proofing modification).
Digging into several years worth of 23&P manuals for the M16 series... The only part that's not part of the 13+2 listed above that changes over the years is the extractor spring.
The black extractor spring is introduced with the M4 and M4A1 and is allowed for M16's at the same time: but the old spring is still in the system and is the preferred part.
The gold hue extractor comes along some time before 2008 and now all AR-15 family guns use the same bolt assembly. The gold spring should be used to replace older springs as the weapons are brought to the armorer.
Then there's the M4 series... Except for overt changes (stock, barrel, handguards, gas tube, upper) and the extractor spring; it's the same damn parts as the M16A2 for the M4. The M4A1 actually gets some throw-back parts to the M16A1 because it's full-auto not bursty.
The heavier "M4A1" barrel isn't an M4A1 part, but a SOCOM substitute that becomes standard later.
Looking at the parts lists I am struck over and over at how many parts are exactly the same from the M16A1 to today.
Over and over I see the powder change in M193 blamed for the Vietnam reliability issue; but I'll be damned if I can find where it was changed again to fix the issue. What I have seen are reports that the chambers were out of spec and the original buffer design was faulty; but those changes were made during the war. In fact, near as I can tell, all of the changes for reliability happen between the time it was XM16E1 to when the buttstock with a storage compartment was added to the M16A1 in the early '70's.
I've also found, (again) over and over, that veterans I've talked to about the M16 have no idea which combination of parts they had. The buffer retro-heads call an "Edgewater" was the early one and the conical springs would collapse causing problems. The present design rifle buffer is heavier and slows the cyclic rate down nearer to the old powder.
The chambers being found out of spec in the field are a nasty combination of corrosion and possibly UAW intransigence. Colt had labor problems about the same time as the XM16E1 was becoming M16A1, some of the work might be sloppy (like not bothering to check wear on a chamber reamer). It's a line of thought I've seen allusions to in several places, but nobody really seems to chase it to prove or disprove it. BUT the chamber problems end when chrome plating is added, which coincidentally is around the same time the labor disputes are settled (and new reamers procured to account for the thickness of the plating).
These aging vets I've been talking to on the whole don't dislike the gun. I've got a skewed sample set since the vets I talk to are car guys. Car guys trend towards mechanical inclination and might take better care of machines with moving parts.
Then I have my own experience with the worn out M16A1's in OSUT. Admittedly, I am a tanker and we didn't train on the M16 near as much as grunts. Where I experienced jams was when we were using blanks. One area where I did get more trigger time than my fellows was my platoon in training being fifth of five, we got range clean-up most often. We got to "get rid of that ammo, private!" a couple times.
If ever there was a time for a worn out M16A1 to fail it'd be at the end of a day of rifle qualifications being sprayed and prayed by enthusiastic teenagers with the full encouragement of their Drill Sergeants.
The recent desections of what happened at Wanat make one wonder...
How many M16 failures in Vietnam can be attributed to overheating the guns?
How much of the controversy was related to lobbying efforts? Robert MacNamara ran rough-shod on several time-honored ways of doing things in the ordnance bureau and their suppliers.
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The failures at wanat were all light machine gun failures, anyway. Despite the prevailing narrative, I don't believe any of the men killed died with a jammed m4 in their hands. Several DID die with jammed or broken weapons, but as I recall they were over heated SAW and m240s, not m4s.
ReplyDeleteIn any case, the idea that you can run a shoulder operated rifle at cyclical for any extended period of time is what caused these issues-not a flawed weapon design.
There's nothing wrong with the m4, that isn't "wrong " with every single other select fire rifle on earth. Despite popular opinion otherwise, ak series rifles aren't immune to the laws of thermodynamics either, and FN and HK haven't found a way to skirt them, either.
The kerfuffle at wanat was all about a lobbyist trying to sell HIS guns, talking smack about his competitor's guns.
Bad things happened at wanat, but I'd suggest that leadership putting men in an indefensible situation where they have to go cyclical and melt their weapons to defend themselves is the biggest issue.
Terrain and smart capable enemies did more to Wanat than any weapons failure. But I'm not talking about Wanat.
DeleteWhat I've been trying to track down, in my disjointed and meandering way, is why the M16 has such a crappy reputation for failing; yet is never replaced with a "better" weapon.
The Army has never been shy about saying, "fuck this piece of shit," when it has a crappy weapon.
The picture that's emerged is the XM16E1 went from the tool-room to battlefield a little too quickly without every part of the system teethed properly, several traditional steps in testing a new rifle were skipped and flaws were found the hard way. Flaws were also FIXED too. Reading up about retro AR builds highlights the changes made and there's good documentation about when those changes occur.
What I haven't stumbled across yet is anyone really looking at the idea that the grunts in 'Nam were overheating their guns in sustained full-auto fire. The M16 was the first service rifle issued widely to US troops that could be fired like that, the M14 was rarely encountered with a selector intact. I know I've seen something about how the Army wasn't willing to invest in training troops to properly use automatic fire, several times including a few lamenting the A2's 3-round burst.